

30 JUNE 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda


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30 JUNE 1971
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 JUNE 1971

Moscow (2978 items)

Indochina	(7%)	11%
[U.S. Press Revelation of U.S. Secret Report	(5%)	8%]
[Oslo War Crimes Meeting	(--)	2%]
Soyuz XI & Salyut	(11%)	10%
30th Anniversary of Nazi Invasion of USSR	(3%)	9%
Soviet Government Statement on 5-Power Nuclear Conference	(--)	8%
OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa	(0.4%)	6%
China	(2%)	3%

Peking (1364 items)

Domestic Issues	(37%)	42%
OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa	(--)	11%
Korean War Anniversary	(--)	9%
Okinawa Reversion Agreement	(3%)	9%
Indochina	(17%)	7%
Iraqi Economic Delegation in PRC	(2%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi caps its reports on the furor over publication of the Pentagon study on Vietnam with a full-page NHAN DAN commentary on 27 June entitled "The Most Obscene Dupery in History." The commentary says actions exposed in the documents should be condemned but asserts that it is more important that "odious acts" of the current Administration be denounced and stopped. NHAN DAN reiterates the view, conveyed in Hanoi's earlier reports, that the documents confirm long-standing Vietnamese charges about U.S. "aggression." The same point was made by the DRV and PRG delegates at Paris, and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy also scored the Nixon Administration for "pretending" to apply a new policy and trying to dissociate itself from the actions of its predecessors.

Moscow continues to charge that the present Administration is following the same "deceitful" policies revealed in the Pentagon documents. Comment speculating on the source of the "leak" includes a 26 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov which elaborates the notion that the publication of the documents was master-minded by powerful U.S. financial circles.

The media of Moscow's East European allies have generally seconded the Soviet line that the Pentagon study confirms U.S. duplicity, although Romania's relatively restrained comment has avoided censure of present U.S. policy. Peking media still have not mentioned the Pentagon documents.

Hanoi reports the return to Paris on 24 June of Politburo member and "special adviser" to the talks Le Duc Tho after an absence of more than a year. The reports quote Tho's remarks on arrival but do not include his responses to reporters' questions.

A new NLHS proposal publicized in Pathet Lao and Hanoi media on 25 June calls for a U.S. bombing halt to be "included" in a cease-fire, modifying the 12 May NLHS peace plan's stipulation that the bombing halt must come first. The new proposal is contained in a letter from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, dated 22 June.

Vietnamese communist battle reports highlight fighting in Quang Tri just south of the demilitarized zone. The capture of Fire Base Fuller is hailed as an "outstanding armed exploit" which, along with other successes, has "shattered" the allied defense line along Highway 9.

DRV, PRG SEE PENTAGON STUDY AS SHOWING CONTINUITY OF POLICY

Hanoi's first press comment on the Pentagon study on Vietnam, the NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA on 27 June, develops the companion themes that present U.S. policies are no more than an

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extension of past ones and that President Nixon's present personal attitudes represent no more than a continuation of those he held in the past. A commentary and an article carried by Liberation Radio on the 27th press essentially the same themes, and a commentary broadcast by the Front radio the next day claims that the documents demonstrate the nefarious nature of the Saigon regime, past and present.

As reported by VNA, the NHAN DAN commentary observes that "it is wrong to say, as some people do, that Nixon has nothing to do with the U.S. aggressive policy" divulged in the documents. Mr. Nixon "showed himself to be a diehard warmonger" when he was vice president, it says, and "kept on supporting the war policy" of the Johnson Administration while he was out of office; since he became President, he "has never given up his aggressive policy but always sought to prolong the war with the 'Vietnamization' plan and 'Nixon Doctrine.'" While declaring that the "vile acts" of previous administrations which the study brings to light must be condemned, NHAN DAN says it is "far more necessary and urgent to denounce, condemn, and resolutely stop the odious acts of the current Nixon Administration aimed at fooling public opinion and thwarting the American people's interests."

Liberation Radio is similarly at pains to trace the President's position back to his tenure as vice president. Thus the Front article on the 27th says that in 1954 he "advocated sending U.S. troops to Dien Bien Phu and using tactical nuclear weapons against the Vietnamese people"; the Front commentary of the same date contains a similar reference to his 1954 views on tactical nuclear weapons. The article charges that the President has "visited South Vietnam on eight occasions to directly step up the war" and that he is continuing now to prolong and expand it and to deceive the American public.

Like earlier Hanoi propaganda, the NHAN DAN commentary observes that the conclusions the American press has drawn from the documents are "no novelty" to the Vietnamese people, whose own government has long been denouncing the U.S. Government's Vietnam policy and "its deceitful measures to cover its barbarous war crimes." NHAN DAN adds that the "two and a half million words" in the documents only reflect "part of the innumerable barbarous crimes" committed by the United States.

The Pentagon study, according to NHAN DAN, shows that one cause of U.S. "failure" in Vietnam was "the miscalculation about the

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Vietnamese people's strength and resolve." The paper concluded by reiterating this resolve--shared by the Cambodian and Lao peoples--"to forge ahead on our triumphal path, to persist in and step up the fight until final victory is won."

Continuing daily reportage in Hanoi and Front media sustains its stress on U.S. reaction, chiefly from senators, to the airing of the study and to the court injunctions against further publication. Hanoi's reports portray a struggle on the issue between the Administration on the one hand and the press and some congressmen on the other hand, and they say the President "was forced to hand over" the study to Congress on 28 June. The reports also say that the President has asked the Supreme Court to bar publication of the study. British Government concern over the publication of the documents is mentioned in a 25 June Hanoi radio report which charges that the U.S. war escalation "as a whole has received strong backing" from the British Government, a cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference.

Hanoi radio continued on 23 and 25-27 June to broadcast installments of Neil Sheehan's article which accompanied the New York TIMES' initial release of the documents, and the radio noted on the 25th that the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN began that day to carry "large excerpts" of the article.

PARIS TALKS Both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and DRV Minister Xuan Thuy, in their statements at the 24 June Paris session, argued that the Pentagon study confirmed that the origin and "direct cause" of the Vietnam war was U.S. "intervention and aggression" and scored the President for continuing and expanding the "aggression." But Mme. Binh devoted the bulk of her statement to denouncing the Vietnamization program, and the VNA and LPA accounts of the session ignore her remarks on the Pentagon study. They report only that she "severely condemned" the Administration for pursuing the war while "seeking by every means to deceive the American Congress and people." In her statement she said the documents only revealed "a part of the truth" of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and were "indisputable confirmation" of what "we have revealed for a long time, at the very first session of this conference."

The DRV's Xuan Thuy echoed and elaborated these sentiments in passages VNA did report. He scored the present Administration for "trying to avoid its responsibilities, pretending that it is

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applying a 'new policy'" and contending that the policies of previous administrations "'belonged to history,' that the deception of the American people is a thing 'of the past.'" According to VNA, he said it is well known "that Mr. Nixon himself was directly concerned in the process of aggression and the war . . . during the past years." And he added that the current Nixon Administration "is more warlike and more deceptive toward the American people than any other previous administration."

As evidence of Administration deceit, Thuy went on to condemn "fraudulent allegations" that included talking about reduced involvement while escalating the war, talking about victory "while suffering defeat," and claiming that the other side is unwilling to negotiate while the United States itself is "hindering" the Paris talks.

VNA says the allied delegates' statements showed how the U.S. disclosure of the documents "has pushed the U.S. and puppets' delegation into a quandary." It adds that they "still perfidiously sought to distort history and obstinately clung to Nixon's five-point program, which has been refuted by the Vietnamese people." VNA's typical brush-off of Ambassador Bruce's remarks thus fails to acknowledge his comment, both in his statement and during the give-and-take portion of the session, that the United States seeks discussion on current issues, not the past. Also ignored are his remarks on the POW issue in which he noted recent broadcast messages purporting to be from U.S. military personnel captured in South Vietnam and sought identification and proper treatment of these men, as well as correspondence between them and their families.*

* The fact that correspondents at the post-session briefing questioned the communist spokesmen about the Ambassador's remarks on prisoners was of course also ignored in communist media, which as usual failed to publicize the briefing. The DRV and PRG press spokesmen sidestepped the questions with the standard formula that if a troop-withdrawal date is set, the question of prisoners of war will be rapidly settled.

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MOSCOW COMMENT ON DOCUMENTS SCORES CONTINUING U.S. "DECEIT"

Moscow continues to comment along established lines on the publication of the Pentagon study, charging that the Administration's "embarrassment" stems from its pursuit of the same "deceitful" policies revealed in the documents, speculating on the source of the "leak," and examining the effect the episode may have on U.S. international relations.

A 26 June PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov elaborates the charge that the publication of the Pentagon study was directed by powerful financial circles in the United States who were becoming concerned with the burdens the protracted war was placing on the U.S. economy. This line had appeared in some previous comment, including the 20 June Moscow domestic service roundtable. According to Zhukov's scenario, the "powerful clans of big business" did not object to the war when President Johnson sent in 500,000 troops because they could profit from the requirements of the Army; but after the spring of 1968, when it became clear that the United States could not win, they began to speak out against the war. Now that the war has brought the United States to the "brink of national disaster" and "the foundations of capitalism have been shaken," Zhukov concludes, the financiers have resorted to release of the documents in a clash with those who rule in Washington.

A PRAVDA New York correspondent on 24 June, on the other hand, took the tack that those who engineered the publication of the documents were "people within the 'establishment' utterly loyal to the American system" whose objective was to bring about a more "realistic" review of foreign policy. In this context, the correspondent observed that more and more "influential political and public figures, including Democrats and Republicans," are declaring support for these who divulged the documents. In a similar vein, Matveyev had commented in the 19 June IZVESTIYA that in recent years a number of "eminent U.S. figures who at first supported" the war now oppose it and that the "sobering process" has now "even" affected the New York TIMES.

Comment speculating on the possible impact on U.S. relations with other countries included a domestic service commentary on the 26th pegged to the new Soviet proposal for five-power nuclear talks. Such talks, the commentary said, are especially timely in light of the Pentagon documents' revelation that the

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question of use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam was discussed by U.S. officials meeting in Honolulu in June 1964. Pursuing the question of foreign impact from another angle, Shakov cautioned in a foreign-language radio talk on the 28th that the Tonkin "provocation" could be repeated elsewhere and cited the Mediterranean as an example.

TASS reported on the 25th that the British Foreign Office, after a meeting between Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and Presidential adviser Kissinger, announced that it had instructed its ambassador in Washington to express British concern that the publication of the documents threatens confidential contacts between the two countries. TASS commented that in this way Britain is helping President Nixon to achieve a ban on the publication of the documents; it quoted the British communist MORNING STAR as saying London's move reflects apprehension that publication will reveal Britain's "direct implication" in misleading public opinion and concealing the facts about the war.

EAST EUROPE Moscow's East European allies have for the most part treated the Pentagon material as confirmation that the United States has been the aggressor in Vietnam and has systematically practiced deception to conceal its actions. A recurrent theme has been that the Nixon Administration is continuing policies revealed in the documents and will persist in these policies despite the present public controversy. The available comment from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary has been marked by unrelieved hostility, while critical Polish comment has included some comparatively detached passages detailing the developments and viewpoints in the controversy over publication of the documents. Romania's reaction has been relatively restrained and has avoided direct criticism of present U.S. policy.

The Budapest domestic service on the 28th carried the first part of a three-part radio play entitled "The McNamara Files," to be broadcast on consecutive days. Allegedly based on facts contained in the documents published by the New York TIMES, the series takes the form of a trial, opening with a "prosecutor" reading a formal indictment of "four consecutive presidents" for committing themselves to continuation of the war.

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LE DUC THO, DRV ADVISER TO PARIS TALKS, RETURNS TO PARIS

Hanoi media reported on 24 June that Politburo member Le Duc Tho, "special adviser" to the DRV delegation at the Paris talks, had left East Germany for Paris that day after attending the SED congress. Tho's arrival in Paris--following a 14-month absence*--and his press conference at the airport were not reported by Hanoi until the 26th, when both VNA and Hanoi radio carried accounts of his arrival and noted that he is in Paris to "exchange with Minister Xuan Thuy a number of opinions concerning the work" there.

Hanoi's account of Tho's prepared statement to the press says he recalled the "great victories" of the three Indochinese peoples in the past two years and expressed confidence in their eventual victory. He is reported to have "vehemently denounced" President Nixon for failing to end the war as he promised during his election campaign in 1968, for expanding the war "with the aim of implementing the Nixon Doctrine through extremely insidious and crafty tricks," and for "pretending" to seek an end to the war.

Tho claimed that four major attacks in Indochina "initiated" by President Nixon had been defeated, citing action in Laos in September 1969, actions in Cambodia in March 1970 and February 1971, and the incursion into Laos this year in which the allies suffered "a defeat of important strategic significance." These "defeats," according to Tho, have prompted the U.S. antiwar movement to develop "to unprecedented proportions."

Tho went on to assert that "time is not in favor of Mr. Nixon" and to state: "If Mr. Nixon is somewhat clearheaded, let him put an end to the Vietnamization policy and enter into serious negotiations aimed at attaining a political solution" He stressed that the Vietnamese people want the United States to withdraw so that no more American men need be killed and all U.S. troops captured in Vietnam can be "allowed to return

* This was Le Duc Tho's longest absence from Paris: He traveled between Paris and Hanoi several times in 1968 and was away from Paris from July 1969 until the end of January 1970. For an account of Tho's remarks when he left Paris in April 1970, see the 15 April 1970 TRENDS, pages 1-2.

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quickly to their families." And he stated that if the Administration pursues its present policy, the Paris talks will remain stalemated, the war will continue, and "the Americans will finally be defeated."

The Hanoi radio account of Tho's arrival reports that he answered newsmen's questions but does not indicate any of the substance of the exchange, thus ignoring Tho's denial that he had any intention of meeting Ambassador Bruce outside the conference hall, his statement that he brought no new initiative "for the time being," and his answer to questions about the Senate passage of the Mansfield amendment calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops in nine months if American prisoners of war are released. (The Vietnamese communist spokesmen at the post-session press briefings in Paris echoed Tho in remarking vaguely that the Senate vote on the Mansfield amendment showed that many people in Congress were opposed to the President's policies. Both Hanoi and Front media reported the 22 June Senate vote without comment.)

PATHET LAO MODIFIES ITS PROPOSAL FOR LAOTIAN SETTLEMENT

Another NLHS peace proposal, modifying the initiative publicized on 12 May, is advanced in a 22 June message from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, reported by Pathet Lao and Hanoi media on the 25th. The latest proposal contains two points:

- + The first point calls for a cease-fire "including having the United States stop bombing" and a "cease-fire in place" to be carried out by "the armed forces in Laos" throughout Lao territory. The plan released on 12 May had proposed that a cease-fire and talks come about only after a bombing halt. The Souphanouvong message and much of the followup comment, however, also continue to repeat the standard NLHS demand that the United States end its aggression in Laos, ending the bombing "as an immediate step" so that the Lao parties concerned can meet.
- + The second point proposed, as in the earlier plan, that immediately after the cease-fire the "concerned parties" in Laos meet to discuss "all questions of common concern," adding that the meetings should take place alternatively in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane. Unlike the 12 May proposal, the current one does not specify subjects to be discussed, such

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as a coalition government and measures guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos. The omission may be responsive to Souvanna Phouma's 26 May message to Souphanouvong--in reply to the 12 May NLHS proposal--which placed no limitations on the subject matter of the talks. And the suggestion on a venue for the talks may be responsive to Souvanna's implication that they should take place in Vientiane.* There is no mention of Khang Kay as a possible location for the talks--the subject of lengthy negotiations last year.

Souphanouvong's letter goes on to assert that a halt to the war and restoration of peace in Laos is desired by "many Lao people of good will," by the King, and by all peace-loving people in the world including "progressive personalities in the United States."

Commentaries on the new proposal carried by Radio Pathet Lao on the 26th and the Pathet Lao news agency on the 27th bring up the U.S. press publication of the Pentagon study in claiming that the American people support Pathet Lao peace initiatives. The news agency says that "the American people, part of the GI's in active service, and part of the U.S. political circles" oppose the Indochina war; that the publication of the Pentagon study has created a "big stir" among the U.S. public; and that "with the backing of the people across the country" the 22 June NLHS proposals, "which meet the legitimate aspirations of the American people and the world public," will win growing support in "friendly countries."

The NLHS proposal gets official support from the DRV and PRG in foreign ministry statements, released on 30 June, which characterize it as a "new" and "very important" initiative. Similar statements had supported the May initiative some 10 days after it was publicized. The Patriotic Neutralist Forces similarly laud the initiative in a statement by their Alliance

* Souvanna Phouma's message had avoided getting into the substance of the NLHS proposals and mentioned neither the U.S. bombing nor the DRV presence, calling instead for "immediate serious discussions" on "all problems which are regarded as suitable for consideration." His suggestion that Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak be given full negotiating powers had been interpreted in subsequent Pathet Lao propaganda as a proposal that the talks be held in Vientiane.

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Committee. The DRV statement asserts that the initiative responds to the aspirations of the Lao people and all peace-loving people in the world, including "many prominent Americans who firmly demand that the Nixon Administration put an end to the war of aggression against Laos." The PRG statement comments in a similar vein, and both warn that the more the United States and its "henchmen" prolong and expand the war the "heavier" its defeat and punishment will be. The DRV and PRG delegations at the Paris talks also issued statements praising the initiative as once again showing the good will and patience of the NLHS in its quest for peace in Laos. The proposal is given further support in a NHAN DAN Commentator's article.

TASS and PRAVDA promptly reported the current proposal and the NHAN DAN article, and Soviet media reported the DRV Paris delegation's statement some 15 hours before VNA did. There is no Soviet comment to date, although Moscow media had devoted some low-level comment to the May initiative. Peking's NCNA reported the NLHS proposal promptly without comment, as it did the earlier one.

HANOI HAILS ATTACKS ON DEFENSE LINE IN NORTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM

Rounding up reports on the fighting at Fire Base Fuller in northern Quang Tri, Hanoi and Liberation Front battle reports on the 28th claim that attacks on and around the base from 21 to 25 June killed or wounded 767 allied troops, including 145 GI's, and "wiped out or heavily decimated" the 1st and 2d Battalions and two companies of the 4th Battalion of the ARVN 2d Regiment. At the fire base itself--designated Hill 544 by the communists--Hanoi claims that the PLAF "annihilated" 350 men including 20 Americans, took many prisoners, destroyed 80 percent of the fortifications, and seized a large quantity of military equipment.

The communist capture of Fire Base Fuller on the night of 23-24 June is hailed in a 26 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which claims that this and other feats in Quang Tri have shattered the allied defense line along Highway 9 and "exerted serious pressure" west of the Quang Tri provincial capital. The army paper says the battle demonstrates the ability of the Quang Tri liberation forces to destroy strong positions manned by allied battalions, and it concludes that they will "certainly surge forward to achieve more resounding exploits."

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An earlier QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, on 25 June, praised "victories" in both Quang Tri and Quang Ngai which it said "show that the Saigon puppet main-force units' strength has extensively declined, that both the seasoned puppet mobile units and the puppet troops manning defensive, blocking positions have been seriously annihilated, and that the Saigon troops cannot avert doom no matter how intensive the U.S. air, artillery, and logistical support may be." The commentary cited attacks in several areas of Quang Tri and praised a surprise attack on ARVN forces at Bai Mau, Son Ha district, in Quang Ngai on 7 June. In that attack, it alleged, the PLAF "annihilated" the 2d Battalion of the ARVN 6th Regiment.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN NORTH

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 24 June issued a routine statement protesting alleged U.S. strikes against the northern part of the DMZ and Quang Binh and Thanh Hoa provinces. The spokesman charged that from 19 to 22 June, U.S. aircraft including B-52's bombed Huong Lap village and U.S. "heavy artillery" from south of the demilitarized zone fired on Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages. The villages lie north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ, according to the statement.

The spokesman also charged that on the 19th U.S. aircraft bombed a number of areas in Tuyen Hoa district, Quang Binh Province, and that on 21 June U.S. ships "fired on the southern area of Hon Me Island belonging to Thanh Hoa Province."

In standard terms, the spokesman condemned "these brazen acts of war" and demanded a permanent end to all U.S. encroachments on the DRV's sovereignty and security.

HANOI, FRONT PUBLICIZE OSLO WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS

A spate of Hanoi and Front propaganda focuses attention on the second session of the International Commission for the Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Indochina, held in Oslo 20-24 June. VNA and Liberation Radio on the 26th and Hanoi radio on the 27th publicized the session's conclusions, including the charge that the "crimes" were the result of long-term U.S. policy and the judgment that the "main burden of responsibility" rests with the policy-makers. The session called

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upon all "men, women, organizations, and governments" to work for an immediate end to the fighting and a U.S. troop withdrawal.

VNA on 29 June carried a lengthy account of the report by Pham Van Bach, head of the DRV delegation to the session and chairman of the DRV War Crimes Commission, noting that Bach denounced U.S. "crimes" in North and South Vietnam as well as in Laos and Cambodia. LPA on 23 June carried "large excerpts" from a report by Nguyen Van Tien's, head of the PRG delegation, which directed its fire chiefly at Vietnamization. On the 30th VNA publicized a document presented at the session which it said "particularly drew attention" to crimes committed against the South Vietnamese "city dwellers" during the Nixon period. On 24, 26, and 29 June LPA publicized reports delivered at the session by various Vietnamese witnesses of U.S. "crimes," containing graphic detail on sufferings attributed to U.S. policy.

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SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

PEKING DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF "U.S. IMPERIALISM" FROM TAIWAN

Peking has again used the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War (25 June) and of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan (27 June) to air its catalog of grievances against U.S. China policy and to promote Asian unity against the United States and Japan. A new recurrent formulation in this year's anniversary propaganda demands that "U.S. imperialism must withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits." This formulation is more vague than the demand advanced in authoritative PRC statements--including PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's speech on this occasion last year--that the United States must withdraw its "armed forces" from Taiwan. While now using the more generalized formulation, Peking has all but ignored the question of improving PRC-U.S. relations, an issue that figured prominently in comment on the 1970 anniversary. Considering Peking's sharply negative comment on this subject last year, its virtual silence this year at a time when the issue is even more topical suggests an effort to assume a position with the broadest possible latitude. The rephrasing of the withdrawal demand seems consistent with such an effort.

Peking marked the Korean War anniversary on 25 June with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a rally addressed by Kuo Mo-jo. NCNA articles and broadcasts to Taiwan were devoted to the 27 June anniversary of President Truman's order for the interdiction of the Taiwan Straits by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Last year, on the major occasion of the 20th anniversary of these events, the Chinese sent a high-level delegation under Huang to take part in ceremonies in Pyongyang. This year the Chinese were represented at the latter by a low-level delegation already present in the DPRK for a youth congress.

In his speech at the Peking rally Kuo focused particularly on the threat the Chinese perceive in a growing Japanese role in Asia under U.S. aegis. Incorporating recent Chinese attacks on the Okinawa reversion agreement, Kuo updated Peking's line on the menacing role envisaged for Japan in the Nixon Doctrine by charging that the Okinawa agreement enables the United States to press the Japanese

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to "undertake bigger military obligations" and to serve on "the first line of [U.S.] aggression in Asia." Declaring that Japanese militarism "has increasingly become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia," Kuo sounded the theme of an Asian "united front" directed against the United States and Japan. As on other occasions on which this theme has figured in the past year, representatives from Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were present at the rally. Unlike last year, however, the Chinese did not take the occasion to get in digs at the Soviets for consorting with the enemy.

TAIWAN Kuo voiced the newly formulated call for withdrawal of "U.S. imperialism" in the course of a denunciation of arrangements designed to separate Taiwan from mainland China. In this connection he expressed standard objections to policies leading to "two Chinas" or to an independent Taiwan. These and other grievances--such as alleged U.S. violations of the PRC's waters and airspace, military support for the ROC, and the U.S. military presence in the Taiwan area--were spelled out in two NCNA articles on the 27 June anniversary. One of the articles, disseminated in NCNA's international service, took special note of the Taiwan independence movement, a subject on which Peking has expressed concern in the past. NCNA called Peng Ming-min, a Taiwan independence leader now in the United States, "a pawn of U.S. imperialism"; it also picked up recent press reports of charges that U.S. military personnel and CIA agents had lent support to the Taiwan independence movement.

The new formulation of the withdrawal demand* seems designed to take account of a situation in which such matters as Japan's influence on Taiwan and the question of sovereignty over Taiwan are of as much concern to Peking's irredentist objectives as the issue of a U.S. military presence. These concerns were reflected in Kuo's discourse on the Japanese danger, as well as in NCNA's references to inclusion of the disputed Senkakus in the Okinawa reversion agreement and to

* There have been some near-precedents for the new formula, as in a 3 December 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the establishment of PRC-Ethiopian diplomatic relations which demanded that "the U.S. aggressors must withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits." And last year on the occasion of the 27 June anniversary, an NCNA account of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan closed with the demand that "U.S. imperialism must get out of Taiwan." None of these variants, however, has appeared in the recurrent, stereotyped pattern used in this year's anniversary propaganda.

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recent U.S. statements that sovereignty over Taiwan remains an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. In Peking's terms, these issues are very much a part of coping with "U.S. imperialism."

BILATERAL RELATIONS Last year, speaking at a 27 June rally in Pyongyang, Huang Yung-sheng defined "the crucial issue" in Sino-U.S. relations as "U.S. occupation of Taiwan by armed force" and called for the United States to withdraw its "armed forces" from Taiwan and the Straits as the condition for a relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations. Huang cited the troop withdrawal demand, together with the accompanying call for the two countries to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence, in explaining the fundamentals of Peking's position at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. Peking had canceled the last scheduled session of the talks the previous May in protest against the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. In his speech, which reflected Peking's efforts at that time to give the cause of Asian communist unity high priority, Huang took a hard line on Sino-U.S. relations, declaring that a relaxation of relations was "out of the question."

While Huang was delivering this authoritative assessment of Sino-U.S. relations in mid-1970, other propaganda on the anniversary was notably explicit in attacking the Nixon Administration's China policy, including the President's appeal for improved relations. An NCNA correspondent's report claimed that the Nixon Administration had pushed "even more frenziedly" the policy of "forcible occupation of Taiwan and opposition to China," and it dismissed the President's call for better Sino-U.S. relations as "nothing but a trick." An NCNA account of alleged U.S. provocations against the PRC called the President and his predecessors since Truman "jackals of the same lair." The Nixon Administration, in fact, had proven to be "even more crafty, sinister, and ferocious" than its predecessors.

On the anniversary this year, in contrast, none of the comment in the central media has offered an assessment of the state of Sino-U.S. relations, nor has there been any discussion of the Nixon Administration's China policy as such. As to be expected on this occasion, the two NCNA articles on Taiwan took note of visits to the island by Vice President Agnew and other U.S. officials, cited U.S. pledges to honor treaty commitments to the ROC, and made much of U.S. military

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activities in the Taiwan area. Also not surprisingly, the passage on Japan in Kuo Mo-jo's speech made the point that the Nixon Administration envisages an important place for Japan in regional affairs. The only direct comment on PRC-U.S. relations appeared in a 27 June broadcast to Taiwan over the PLA's Fukien Front Radio--a transmitter beaming propaganda to the people of Taiwan, outside the mainstream of Peking comment designed for an international audience. The broadcast accused the President of playing a "counter-revolutionary doubledealing game" by professing to improve relations with the PRC while seeking to effect a permanent severance of Taiwan from mainland authority.

Thus, although the formulation regarding withdrawal of "U.S. imperialism" might be read as a stronger demand than the one calling only for military withdrawal, it seems significant--against the background of recent signs of movement in Sino-U.S. relations--that Peking did not use the anniversary this year to signal a hard line by commenting adversely on the prospects for improved relations. In this context, the broader, more propagandistic formulation may have been adopted to offset Western press speculation, including some based on talks with high PRC officials, over the precise terms on which Peking would accept an accommodation on the Taiwan issue.

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CEAUSESCU TOUR

The Romanian party-government delegation under Ceausescu returned home on 24 June after an Asian tour on which the Romanians flaunted their banner of independence while practicing their ecumenical line in the communist movement. The strains in Soviet-Romanian relations, aggravated by the demonstration of common interests between Peking and Bucharest during the Romanians' stay in the PRC, were reflected in the cool reception given the delegation on its stopover in Moscow en route home. The delegation was met by Kosygin and Suslov but not by Brezhnev and Podgornyy, who hold Ceausescu's counterpart titles of party chief and head of state. TASS reported that heads of "some" diplomatic missions were present, while the Romanian agency AGERPRES noted the presence of the PRC ambassador and the envoys of other countries visited.

ROMANIANS, NORTH VIETNAMESE STRESS NEED FOR SOLIDARITY

During its 15-19 June visit to North Vietnam, the Romanian delegation was accorded high-level treatment comparable to its reception in the PRC and DPRK.* The Romanians were met at the airport by most of the members of the Politburo, including Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Le Thanh Nghi.** Le Duan and Pham Van Dong hosted the visitors in Hanoi and Dong accompanied them on a trip to Haiphong.

The joint communique said that the talks were held in an atmosphere "full of sincerity, solidarity, and fraternal friendship," a formulation similar to that used in the communiqués in the PRC and the DPRK and reflecting a stress on solidarity despite divergent views on several issues. As in the case of other countries visited, a Romanian invitation

* The Romanians' visit to the PRC is discussed in the 9 June TRENDS, pages 16-21; their stay in the DPRK is covered in the 23 June TRENDS, pages 23-25.

* Le Duc Tho was absent, attending the East German party congress, and Hoang Van Hoan inexplicably did not appear. Hoan's last known public appearance was at Tho's departure, reported by VNA on 10 June.

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for a party-government delegation to reciprocate the visit was accepted. The joint communique did not specify individuals, but at an 18 June banquet Ceausescu expressed the hope of again meeting Le Duan and Pham Van Dong in Romania.

In the joint communique, Romania affirmed its determination to continue to extend "political, moral, and material support," while the Vietnamese thanked the Romanians for their "political support, economic and military aid, and assistance in the training of technicians." (For the past several years both Romania and the DRV have acknowledged that military aid is included in the annual aid agreements, the most recent of which was signed in November 1970.) The sides expressed determination to further develop friendship and "many-sided cooperation," pledging that "mutual support and assistance will be increased." In speeches the leaders specifically noted that economic cooperation will be stepped up.

The visit afforded Le Duan an opportunity to repeat demands for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and to express Hanoi's determination to continue the struggle. The communique routinely denounced Vietnamization as a plan to prolong the war and scored U.S. air attacks on the DRV and intensified actions in Laos and Cambodia. Charging that the United States is plotting "new military adventures," it said that the Vietnamese people, acting in accordance with Ho Chi Minh's testament, are determined to struggle until final victory. Both sides once again supported the programs for a political settlement of the NPLSV and the NLHS and Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 appeal and the FUNK program.

During the visit both sides stressed their mutual interest in strengthening communist unity. Ceausescu observed, as he had done in Pyongyang, that his visit contributed not only to the solidarity of the two countries but also to unity among the socialist countries. Consistent with the neutrality of both countries in the Sino-Soviet dispute, no criticism was directed at Moscow or Peking. As he had done during his visits to the PRC and the DPRK, Ceausescu alluded to the dispute in an 18 June Hanoi rally speech in which he cited a need to overcome fraternal strife. The communique declared that the two sides will seek to strengthen friendship with "all" fraternal socialist countries and to contribute to the "restoration and consolidation of solidarity among the

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socialist countries." The North Vietnamese joined with the Romanians in a line particularly dear to the latter, affirming that "all the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights."

The North Vietnamese balked, however, at following the Romanians further down the line of independence in the communist camp--a caution evidently dictated by an awareness of the DRV's dependence on backing from its big brothers. In Peking and Pyongyang Ceausescu had declared that there was no longer a center in the communist movement, a point included in the Romanian-DPRK communique, but this subject was not broached during the DRV visit. As Hanoi frequently does, Le Duan in several speeches named both the Soviet Union and China when thanking the communist countries for their assistance. Even more pointedly, a 21 June NHAN DAN editorial on the visit stressed that strengthening of the solidarity of "the socialist camp"--a term avoided by the Romanians, Chinese, and North Koreans--is "an imperative demand which is intimately connected with the revolutionary cause of Vietnam." The editorial added that the Vietnamese will do their utmost to secure solidarity within the socialist camp, specifically mentioning unity with the Soviet Union and China in this connection.

Hanoi's awareness of a need for big-power communist support was also reflected when Le Duan, in his speech on 18 June, pointed out that the Romanian communists led a successful uprising in 1944 in the wake of the Soviet army offensive. Ceausescu on the same occasion referred to the uprising without mentioning a Soviet role.

North Vietnamese aversion to detente politics was reflected in the absence of expressions of support for Romanian policies on European security that had been recorded in the communiqués signed in the PRC and the DPRK. As he had done on the earlier legs of the trip, Ceausescu had called in a speech for a European security conference and for the removal of foreign troops and bases. The joint communique went no further than a generalized expression of support for Romanian contributions to "the defense of peace and security in Europe and the world" plus a demand for de jure recognition of the GDR. The Middle East question was simply ignored in the communique.

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ROMANIANS CONCLUDE ASIAN TOUR WITH LACKLUSTER VISIT TO MPR

A lackluster visit to the MPR from 21 to 24 June did little more than touch base with Moscow's Asian satellite. According to the joint communique, the talks were held in "a comradely atmosphere and in a spirit of friendship and sincerity," and an invitation for a reciprocal visit by a delegation headed by Usedenbal was accepted.

On this leg of their tour the Romanians were able to find agreement on certain issues that had been divisive in their earlier stops. Thus the communique registered the two sides' agreement that the Middle East conflict should be settled in consonance with the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and both sides called for a European security conference. But unlike the three previous communiqués, which demanded a UN seat for the PRC, this one ignored China altogether.

The two sides agreed that strengthening of unity of the communist countries "is of fundamental importance," but on the question of independence they had recourse to a formulation unobjectionable even to Moscow and lacking the forceful affirmation of autonomy that marked the earlier phases of the delegation's Asian tour.

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NUCLEAR TALKS

MOSCOW CLAIMS WIDE SUPPORT FOR FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

Claims of worldwide favorable reaction to the Soviet call for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference pervade Moscow's followup comment on the Soviet Government statement addressed to Washington, Peking, Paris, and London. Rebroadcasts of the statement, released in Soviet media on 22 June, account for more than half of Moscow's substantial radio publicity for the proposal. Radio and press comment describes it as yet another initiative consistent with the USSR's "peace-loving Leninist foreign policy," and commentators say that the "new, specific step to rid mankind of the danger of nuclear war" demands a response from the other nuclear powers.

The first reactions worldwide are said to have cut across political lines. In circles of widely varying views, according to a foreign-language radio talk on the 24th, the proposal was generally appraised as "a very topical and very positive step." This claim recurs in a RAVDA article by Yuriy Yasnev on the 29th, summarized by TASS. But the article goes on to profess surprise at efforts of "certain" U.S. and British papers to link the convening of a conference "with the solution of certain international issues" at a time when Washington and London are considering the proposal. Such an approach, according to the article, is "none other than premeditated obstruction, a deliberate striving for postponing for a long time the freeing of mankind from the heavy burden of the nuclear arms race."

Reporting the opening session on the 29th of the reconvened 25-nation Geneva disarmament talks, TASS noted that the head of the U.S. delegation, James Leonard, indicated that the United States agreed that there are certain questions which could be discussed just by the nuclear powers. He added, TASS continued, that there are other questions which should be discussed by both the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and for that reason the United States is "favorably disposed to the participation of all nuclear powers in the efforts toward the control of armaments." TASS concluded that "members of the American delegation answered in the affirmative" when asked if Leonard's remarks could be regarded as agreement to the conference proposal.

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BROADCASTS IN MANDARIN Sustained comment in Mandarin over Radio Moscow and the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress plays up the idea that a nuclear disarmament accord would serve the Chinese people's interests and avoids the polemics that have characterized earlier Soviet comment on the PRC's attitude toward disarmament. Moscow now pointedly reminds Chinese audiences of the PRC's own past calls for nuclear disarmament. Typically, a Radio Moscow talk in Mandarin on the 24th said "the Soviet people still remember that the Chinese Government also proposed at one time to completely ban nuclear tests and weapons and to destroy these weapons." A Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the 26th recalled that PEOPLE'S DAILY in October 1957 called on governments which possess strong armed forces to reach agreement "at the earliest date on disarmament, mainly the banning and testing of nuclear weapons."

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